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Abstract 
There is a consensus that the emphasis on the management of water resources should 
be put on demand side policies. However, some questions remain to be solved on the supply 
side, which are frequently absent from empirical studies based on the estimation of cost 
functions. This paper aims to fill to some extent this gap in the literature by focusing the 
consequences of water losses reduction and the management of water resources based on their 
availability at an integrated river basin level. 
Major findings indicate that it would be better in terms of costs to maintain some level of 
water losses than to repair the leaks and suggest advantages from more concentration in the 
Portuguese water industry. In addition, the costs do not seem to be systematically influenced 
by the hydrographical regions to which water utilities belong, what might be due to the 
absence of appropriate cost accounting methods. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since water has been recognized as a scarce resource there has been considerable 
pressure from the general public, regulatory agencies and some governments to minimize the 
impacts of new water supply projects. It has, in fact, become clear that the emphasis should be 
shifted towards managing water demand by better utilizing the water resources already 
available. 
The literature that debates water industry changes and restructuring conditions necessary 
to promote higher levels of performance is abundant. Some empirical studies focus on the 
analysis of the cost structure of the local utilities, a pre-requisite to define regulatory schemes 
intended to fulfill better efficiency targets. Examples of some of the main specific issues 
addressed are: the design of optimal price schemes, the evaluation of the effects of ownership 
and regulation and testing for economies of scale and of scope. 
However, on the supply side some essential questions remain to be solved, but these 
are frequently absent from the empirical literature on the estimation of water cost functions. 
This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature to some extent by focusing on two specific 
issues: the consequences of reducing the volume of water losses, and the management of water 
resources based on their availability at an integrated river basin level. 
Therefore, by analysing the Portuguese water supply cost structure, this paper has three 
objectives. First, it aims to assess the cost structure consequences of the joint production of 
water delivered to Portuguese final users and water losses, which is an issue rarely treated in 
the literature. Secondly, it intends to assess whether the cost structure is significantly 
influenced by the fact that water utilities are located in different hydrographical regions. 
Finally, it intends to determine whether the industry exhibits economies of scale and over what 
range of output it occurs. 
Regarding the first purpose, one point of interest of this paper is the investigation into 
why water losses in Portuguese municipal systems stand at more than 30%, which is the 
average level estimated for OECD members. An initial possibility that does not require further 
explanation is that in many cases there has been insufficient investment in the water network 
infrastructure. Another factor, which we will look at in detail, is linked to the possible 
economic and financial rationality of maintaining a high level of leaks rather than repairing 
them. 
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Regardless of any economic and financial effects, there are other arguments that by 
themselves justify the importance of reducing water losses. One of them concerns the 
environmental aspects in the context of seasonal and spatial scarcity of water resources. 
Furthermore, the reduction of water losses can also have a significant social impact, due to the 
European Water Framework Directive (WFD) requirement to recover all the costs of water 
supply by adopting adequate pricing policies. 
The rationale for including information related to river basins as potential determinants 
of water utilities costs comes from the requirement that all water costs, including resource 
costs, must be recovered in full. This is required by the WFD and also by the OECD 
Environmental Strategy (OECD, 2006), according to which, member countries should apply 
the ecosystem approach to the management of freshwater resources. The inclusion of these 
variables is an innovative feature of the paper. 
In addition, it is particularly relevant to carry out this study in Portugal. As pointed out 
by the Portuguese Institute for the Regulation of Water and Solid Waste (IRAR, hereunder) it 
is crucial to optimize the use of water resources without ignoring the universal service 
obligation. In order to comply with this, special attention should be given to the reduction of 
leaks in the systems, to attain acceptable efficiency levels IRAR (2005:82). 
Furthermore, since the Portuguese water industry is organized in multiple local 
monopolies, and is usually considered by national authorities – MAOT (2000), IRAR (2005) 
and MAOTDR (2006) – as a natural monopoly industry, it provides an interesting field of 
study. 
To sum up, the current study is original in using the broad (and first) database collected 
by the Portuguese National Water Institute (INAG, hereafter), through the National Survey on 
Water Supply and Wastewater Systems, to estimate the cost structure of Portuguese water 
utilities. 
The results provided by this study can, in our opinion, shed some light on how the 
Portuguese regulatory authority should intervene to reduce the problem of water losses while 
providing adequate incentives to operators of water supply systems to meet sustainable and 
appropriate financial targets. All in all, the findings of this study can support water allocation 
decision making and have important policy implications. 
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This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 some economic cost analysis concepts 
are reviewed. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the literature on the estimation of water 
cost functions. Section 4 describes the model specifications. Section 5 is dedicated to the 
dataset description and methodology. Empirical results are presented in Section 6, and Section 
7 offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Water supply and economic cost analysis  
In a context where water is accepted as a scarce resource and environmental damage 
caused by water consumption is recognized as an external cost for society, it is of primordial 
importance to understand the rationale behind the behaviour of water utilities. It is expected 
that water utilities try to minimize total costs while having to satisfy market demand and the 
regulator’s impositions. Therefore, the knowledge of the cost structure of water utilities is 
essential to identifying the existence or the absence of incentives to efficiently satisfy demand. 
In fact, a supplier which needs to increase its output can choose between two options: an 
investment programme to repair the leaks in the system or an increase in production capacity, 
according to their respective costs. Obviously, the consequences in terms of the overall 
efficiency of the system and on the use of the resource will be different. 
However, water losses are almost always treated in the current literature as a form of 
demand management, instead of an initiative being included, as they should be, in the supply 
side strategies, as pointed out by Merrett (2005:91). 
There are several justifications for reducing water losses. Firstly, due to their financial 
and economic relevance, since they mostly represent water delivered to final costumers (water 
for human consumption), with very demanding quality requirements which imply high 
production and treatment costs. Secondly, because of the environmental consequences of 
water losses, related to the seasonal and spatial scarcity of water resources. Finally, the 
reduction of water losses can also affect consumers, because the WFD requires that by 2010 
(Art. 9, no.1) the European Union’s member states should recover all the costs of water supply 
through pricing policies. 
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Related to this last aspect, the study of the cost structure of water utilities is important to 
finding out if consumers are paying for supplier’s inefficiency. 
Moreover, analysis of the cost structure of utilities also allows questions related to the 
market structure of the water industry to be addressed. Depending on whether the cost 
function exhibits economies of scale and of scope, arguments for or against the integration of 
various operators into a single one may emerge. The theoretical framework for the estimation 
of a proper cost function is therefore now reviewed. 
Microeconomic theory generally defines cost as a function of output(s), Y, and inputs 
prices, W, ( ),C Y W . However, in empirical studies, authors frequently include other 
explanatory variables: a Z vector, related to structural and technical characteristics as well as 
to the economic environment. Therefore, the cost function becomes ( ), ,C Y W Z . In the water 
industry variables of this type are related to the network length and connections, area served, 
capacity utilization, regulatory environment, and so on. 
In order to simplify this part of the analysis, only output variables are included, since 
suppressing the others interferes neither with the main expressions nor with the results 
obtained in this section. 
As market competition conditions are frequently absent from the water industry, it is 
important to determine whether the monopolies that run the industry are natural ones. 
Although natural monopolies are often characterized by the presence of economies of scale, 
this condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for natural monopoly under multi-product 
contexts. Cost function’s strict subadditivity is the “critical concept” for the existence of a 
natural monopoly in multi-product industries (Baumol, 1977:809). In its simplest formulation, 
the cost function subadditivity condition is defined as: 
( )
1 1
n n
i i
i i
C y C y
= =
⎛ ⎞ <⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (1) 
for all y such that 0ii y ≠∑ . Subadditivity therefore means that, over the relevant range of 
outputs, it is always cheaper to have a single firm producing whatever combination of 
output(s) since it costs less to produce the various output(s) bundles together than to produce 
them separately (Tirole, 1988:19). Thus, under a natural monopoly it is not efficient to have 
several firms producing the output(s). 
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Baumol (1977:185) notes that in a multi-product case, “sufficient conditions for 
subadditivity must include some sort of complementarity in the production of the different 
outputs of the industry”. Declining “ray average cost” (RAC) and “transray convexity” (TRC) 
are two conditions that together are sufficient to guarantee the strict and global subadditivity 
of costs (Baumol, 1977; Baumol et al., 1988), corresponding to the requirements for 
subadditivity with strong complementarities. 
It is well known that calculating average cost implies that costs are being averaged over 
total output. However, in the multi-product case it raises the question of the measure of total 
output, since we cannot simply add different types of output. The idea behind RAC is to 
aggregate the entire output vector into a composite good (Y), through some fixed proportions. 
Thus, the output bundle varies in fixed proportions along a ray (r) that allows measurement of 
the average cost, as in the single-product case, as suggested by Kim (1985:199). For the two (i 
and j) output case, RAC becomes: 
( ) ( ),, C Y rRAC Y r
Y
= , with j
i
y
r
y
=  (2) 
Nevertheless, because firms are not always increasing or decreasing output along rays, it 
is also important to know about the behaviour of the cost function between rays, or in other 
words, about complementarities in production by moving across rays (Berg and Tschirhart, 
1988). Roughly speaking, if a cost function is transray-convex, then it means that it is cheaper 
to produce outputs in combinations rather than to produce them separately. 
A cost function ( )C Y  is TRC at Y if, for every two output vectors, Ya and Yb, lying in the 
same hyperplane as Y, 
( ) ( )( ) (1 ) (1 )a b a bC Y C kY k Y kC Y k C Y⎡ ⎤= + − ≤ + −⎣ ⎦   (3), 
for any k, 0 1k< <  (Baumol, 1977). The TRC concept is “closely related to what Panzar and 
Willig have named ‘economies of scope’” (Baumol, 1977:811) but economies of scope are a 
weaker form of cost complementarity than TRC. Thus, Baumol et al. (1988) provide an 
alternative approach, which permits testing for subadditivity, without strong cost 
complementarities. In this context, sufficient conditions for subadditivity come from 
economies of scope together with a stronger substitute for economies of scale: specific 
economies of scale for each product. 
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A necessary condition for subadditivity is the presence of economies of scope. If it is 
rejected then global subadditivity is rejected. In this case, it is possible to test for ray 
subadditivity, a sort of partial subadditivity (Baumol et al., 1988), by analysing the behaviour 
of RAC. 
Economies of scope refer to the situation where the joint production costs are lower than 
the sum of production costs for separate specialised firms or other operators. The degree of 
economies of scope is, thus, given by: 
( ) ( )
( )1
n
n i
i
C Y C Y
SP
C Y
−
=
−
=
∑
 (4) 
where ( ) ( )1 1 1,..., ,0, ,...,n i i i nC Y C y y y y− − += . Operators face (dis)economies of scope if SP 
takes (negative) positive values. The cost savings of joint production may arise from two 
sources. One is the production of a large output bundle, and the subsequent reduction of an 
excess capacity, which allows for the diminution of the average fixed costs. Another source is 
taking advantage from cost complementarities (Pulley and Humphrey, 1991:4). For the two-
product (i and j) case, cost complementarity occurs if: 
2
0
i j
C
y y
∂ ≤∂ ∂   (5) 
This inequality means that an increase in the j production decreases, or at least keeps constant, 
the i product’s marginal cost. 
Economies of scale are said to exist if an output increase is associated with a less than 
proportional increase in cost. Product-specific economies of scale measure how costs vary 
with changes in a specific output, keeping the quantities of the other outputs constant. There 
are product-specific (for the i product) and overall economies of scale if SLi and SL, which are 
respectively given by: 
( )
( )ii i i
IC Y
SL
y MC Y
=  (6.1); ( )
( )
1
n
i i
i
C Y
SL
y MC Y
=
=
∑
 (6.2) 
take values larger than unity, with 
( ) ( ) ( )i n iIC Y C Y C Y −= −  (7) 
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being the incremental cost related to the production of a given level of product i, while the 
amounts of the other products remain constant. The utilities face decreasing returns to scale if 
1SL <  and constant returns to scale if 1SL = . 
Estimating the cost structure of an industry requires choosing a functional form. 
According to both theoretical considerations and the type of data available, different cost 
function specifications, such as transcendental logarithmic (translog), hybrid, parabolic, or 
quadratic, are found in the literature. The translog specification seems to be currently the most 
popular one for the estimation of multi-product cost functions. However, the quadratic 
specification is particularly helpful in certain contexts, including the analysis of economies of 
scope, while the translog function is not capable of robustly representing the cost function 
unless modified for zero output values (Baumol, 1977; Fuss et al., 1978; and Baumol and 
Willig, 1986). 
In addition to data restrictions, which sometimes require the imposition of a restrictive 
form, the several properties that a multi-product cost function should exhibit also limit the 
choice of the cost specification. In relation to those properties, first, the cost function must be 
nondecreasing, concave and linearly homogeneous in the input prices, and nonnegative and 
nondecreasing in its outputs (Diewert, 1982; Baumol et al., 1988). Second, for the purposes of 
a multi-product industry analysis, the cost function should yield a reasonable cost figure for 
output vectors which entail zero outputs of some goods1. Third, the functional form should not 
presuppose the presence or absence of any of the cost properties that play an important role in 
the analysis of the specific industry, such as complementarity of costs or scope 
(dis)economies, when considering firms whose production of some output is zero. Fourth, the 
cost function should be parsimonious in the number of parameters to be estimated. 
 
 
                                                 
1  According to Baumol et al. (1988:449), “this is a desideratum violated by several of the functional forms often 
used in statistical studies”. Examples of those specifications are the Cobb-Douglas and the translog cost function. 
In that case, that violation occurs if input prices are considered to be included in the fixed components and in the 
coefficients to be estimated as unspecified functions of the vector W, instead of being explicitly incorporated. 
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3. Overview of the empirical literature on water cost functions 
Empirical literature on water cost functions belongs to the major field of water utilities 
performance analysis, usually in the context of regulating and reorganizing the water industry. 
Most of the studies relate to the United States (US), England and Wales (E&W) and France 
(Renzetti and Dupont: 2003). Despite some differences between the studies with respect to 
specific objectives and approaches, empirical studies have almost always tended to focus on 
the efficiency (a particular measure of the performance) of municipal water utilities. 
In order to pursue the stated general objective, one of the possible approaches, followed 
by Byrnes et al. (1986), Cubin and Tzanidakis (1998), Bhattacharyya et al. (1995) and others, 
consists of using data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
The DEA model uses linear programming to define a frontier of the most efficient firms 
in order to compare all the other firms’ performance with this frontier. This methodology thus 
underpins the use of benchmarking tools to better regulate water and sewerage services. De 
Witte and Marques (2007), for example, address the specific policy issue of benchmarking to 
provide incentives for cost containment in the context of several EU member states. For 
Portugal, Marques (2006) proposes a yardstick competition model for Portuguese water and 
sewerage services regulation, also derived from DEA methodology. 
The same objective of studying efficiency issues can be studied by the econometric 
approach, which is based on the estimation of water utilities cost functions. Three main 
specific purposes can be found in the relevant empirical literature. One is to evaluate price 
schemes and to design optimal prices (Garcia-Valiñas, 2005; Garcia and Reynaud, 2004; Kim, 
1995; Renzetti, 1992). Another is to analyse the effects of ownership and regulation on utility 
performance (Saal and Parker, 2000; Bhattacharyya et al., 1995; Feigenbaum and Teeples, 
1983). Finally, the third purpose is to check for the presence of economies of scale and of 
scope in the water industry (Stone & Webster Consultants, 2004; Fraquelli et al., 2002; Garcia 
and Thomas, 2001; Fabbri and Fraquelli, 2000; Hayes, 1987; Kim, 1985). 
Our research focuses on the third objective, for two reasons. Firstly because the 
ownership issue is a secondary question, since the great majority of utilities operating in the 
Portuguese water sector are publicly owned and operated. Second, because evidence of scope 
and scale economies is central to the debate on the existence of a natural monopoly structure. 
As noted by Kim (1985:185), if there are economies of scale, large firms could produce at 
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lower average costs than smaller ones, “then a valid policy argument can be made for the 
establishment of a large firm in order to gain the benefits of these economies.” 
Regardless of the main purpose of the studies, the empirical literature which has dealt 
with the estimation of water cost functions offers several methods of calculating marginal 
costs. These include econometric techniques (see Garcia-Valiñas, 2005; Garcia and Reynaud, 
2004; Timmins, 2002; Feigenbaum and Teeples, 1983; Renzetti, 1992; Bhattacharyya et al., 
1995) and direct formulas (see Turvey, 1976; Ford and Warford, 1969). The dependent 
variable commonly used is production (operational) costs, because there is more uncertainty 
about the calculation of the remaining elements of costs, such as economic and environmental 
externalities and opportunity costs (Rogers et al., 2002), as pointed out by Garcia-Valiñas 
(2005:192). 
Table 1 provides information related to some of the main studies published on the 
estimation of water cost function literature. 
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Table 1 - Summary of selected studies on water utilities cost functions 
Author(s) (ano) Studied area 
Functional 
form Outputs 
Other explanatory 
variables) Main results 
Martins (2007) Portugal Quadratic, 
cubic 
YS;Yl; 
YS;YWW; 
Network length; Customer 
density; 
Dummies for privatization 
and regulation; … 
SP>0; SL>1 for small and medium 
production scales; 
SP<0 between YS and YWW for high 
production scale 
Martins et al. 
(2006) 
Portugal Quadratic YR;YN; 
YS;YL 
Network length; Customer 
density; dummies for 
management type and 
regulation;… 
SP>0 for small production scales; SL>1 for 
small and medium production scales; 
Industry average production scale< MES 
Coelho (2006) Portugal Quadratic YR;YN --------- SP>0; SL>1 for small and medium 
production scales; Industry average 
production scale< MES 
(*) Garcia-
Valiñas (2005) 
Seville, 
Spain 
Cobb-
Douglas 
YS; Input prices; 
Network length; 
Feldstein’s formula for pricing achieves 
distributional objectives without 
substantially reducing social welfare 
Aubert and 
Reynaud (2005) 
Wisconsin 
US 
Translog YS; 
Customer
s 
Input prices; 
Value of assets; 
Technical variables 
Short run SL>1; Long run SL ~ 1 
Efficiency partly explained by the regulatory 
environment  
Stone & Webster 
Consultants 
(2004) 
E & Ws Translog, 
quadratic 
Proxies 
for YS and 
YWW 
Input prices; 
Capital stock; 
… 
SP < 0 between YS and YWW; 
Vertical SP > 0; 
SL ~ 1 for WoCs; SL < 1 for WaSCs 
(*) Garcia and 
Reynaud (2004) 
Bordeaux
France 
Translog Y 
YS 
Input prices; 
Network length  
Customers 
Prices ≠ Marginal costs Æ Small welfare 
losses; Distributional effects of the fixed 
charge > effects of moving toward efficient 
pricing 
Fraquelli et al. 
(2002) 
Italy Translog Yi Input prices SP>0; Moderate SL for small production 
scales 
Garcia and 
Thomas (2001) 
Bordeaux 
France 
Translog YS; YL Input prices; 
Number of costumers; 
Network length; 
Production, stocking and 
pumping capacity. 
SP>0; Moderate SL 
Saal and Parker 
(2000) 
E & W Translog YS; YWW Input prices; 
Dummies for privatization 
SL<1 for WaSCs, SP < 0 
Privatisation increased profits but not 
productivity; Efficiency improvements with 
new price-caps. 
Fabbri and 
Fraquelli (2000) 
Italy Translog, 
Cobb-
Douglas 
YS Input prices; 
Customers; 
Network length, water 
input cost, treatment costs 
High SL for the average size of Italian firms, 
SL<1 for the biggest operators. 
Ashton (2000) E & W Translog Proxy for 
YS 
Input prices; SL>1 
Bhattacharyya et 
al. (1995) 
US Translog Y Input prices 
 
Privately owned water utilities: more 
efficient for small operation, 
Public utilities: more efficient for large 
operation. 
Kim (1995) US Translog YR;YN;  Input prices; 
Capacity utilization; 
Service distance 
Existing price structure ≠ Marginal costs but 
close to second-best optimum. 
(*) Renzetti 
(1992) 
Vancouve
r Canada 
Translog YS Input prices; 
Customers, 
Capital stock 
Prices ≠ Marginal costsÆ Small welfare 
losses; 
Ramsey pricesÆLarge reduction in welfare  
Hayes (1987) US Quadratic YWH; YR --------- SP>0; SL>1 for small and medium 
production scales 
Kim (1985) US Translog YR;YN Input prices 
Capacity  utilization; 
Service distance 
SLi >1 for YN; SLii < 1 for YR;  
Generally SL = 1; 
Average production scale> MES 
Ford and 
Warford (1969) 
E & W Linear, 
quadratic, 
logarithmic. 
YS --------- Uncertainty about SL. 
Notes: 1 (*) In this Table only aspects related to the cost function are presented, although demand for water function is are also derived. 
            2. For easier comparison of the studies, the original notation has sometimes been changed.  
Y - Water produced, YS - Total water supplied; YR - Residential water supplied; YN - non-residential water supplied; YWH - wholesale water; YRT 
-retail water; YL - water losses; YWW - wastewater collected; Yi, i = gas, water, electricity supply. 
WaSCs: Water and Sewerage Companies; WoCs: Water only Companies. 
MES: Minimum efficient scale 
Source: authors. 
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As mentioned before, concerning the independent variables, empirical studies test for the 
influence of two types of variable: output, and other kinds of explanatory variables. In relation 
to output, some studies follow a single output approach and others a multiple output one. In 
this latter case, it is usual to find the purpose of analysing whether there is scope for horizontal 
integration between the supply of water to residential and non-residential consumers, between 
water supply and sewage collection. Less often involved is the analysis of the water supply 
and water losses, which is our scope of analysis, and the rationale for vertical integration, i.e., 
the consequences of the joint production of wholesale and retail water.  
When available, authors frequently consider data on the prices of inputs, such as labour, 
capital, energy, materials and other consumable inputs. In addition, the use of qualitative and 
technical variables has become common in the literature. 
However, when it comes to the availability of water, and even though the importance of 
an efficient management of these resources is recognized, no cost estimation studies which 
incorporate that type of information are known. Since the WFD imposes the complete 
recovery of all components of costs, including scarcity ones, it is extremely relevant to include 
data related to the availability of water resources in empirical studies, which we have tried to 
do with our hydrographical region variables. 
Different types of data, such as time-series, cross-section and panel data, have been used 
and several functional forms for the cost equation (Cobb-Douglas, transcendental logarithmic 
form - translog, or quadratic) have been tested. 
Regarding the main findings, and in relation to the evaluation of pricing schemes, 
empirical studies reveal that second best prices do not imply relevant welfare losses. The 
empirical literature does not indicate a clear relationship between ownership or regulation and 
performance. With respect to returns to scale and economies of scope, estimations are not 
conclusive either. However, most studies found that there are economies of scale in the water 
industry, but only for some levels of output production. In several cases authors even found 
that diseconomies of scale can occur for high production levels. These last results contradict 
the belief that the water industry is a natural monopoly for all output levels. 
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4. Model specification 
As seen in earlier, the empirical literature provides several cost function forms. 
Although the popularity of the translog specification is evident, the quadratic functional form 
has some advantages for our purposes over the translog one. As noted by Kwoka (2002:659), 
the strict cost minimization proposition imposed for Shepherd’s Lemma, which is usually 
applied in translog estimation, is suspect in the case of regulated utilities. Indeed, the translog 
form presupposes a firm’s rational behaviour2, which is difficult to find in the water industry, 
where there is no competition and public management and ownership is very strong, 
particularly in Portugal. On the other hand, the quadratic form requires fewer behavioural 
assumptions, it is parsimonious in relation to the number of parameters to be estimated and it 
is very well-suited to capture the fixed cost effects, which are important in an industry 
supposed to be a natural monopoly. In addition, the quadratic specification easily gives a 
measure for economies of scope without requiring modifications concerning zero outputs. 
Given the contribution of studies conducted in the field of multi-product water cost 
function and the type of data available, we use the following quadratic multi-product cost 
function: 
( )
2
1 1 1
1,
2
n n l
i i i i k k
i i k
C Y Z a b y c y x z
= = =
⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑  (8) 
where C is the (short run) total cost of water supply, a is the regression constant, Y is the 
outputs vector and Z is the vector of the other variables (technical, structural and industry 
ambience). Since we have no data for input prices, we assume that: a , ib  and ic  are 
unspecified functions of the vector W (see Section 2). 
The Portuguese water industry’s cost structure is evaluated through a multi-product cost 
function estimation approach, considering two outputs: water supplied (yS) and water losses 
(yL). The model to be estimated is: 
                                                 
2 The consistency with the production theory requires that if the utilities operate efficiently the cost function must 
be homogeneous of degree one in input prices and the cost function’s Hessian matrix must be symmetric with 
respect to input prices. 
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( ) ( )2 2 2 21 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 3 4 5
6 1 7 2 8 3 9 4 10 5 11 6
1, ,
2
                           
                           
            
m m m m m m m mS L m S L S L S L
m m m m m
m m m m m m
C y y Z a b y b y c y c y c y c y
x Leng x Dens x Acq x CM x Reg
x HR x HR x HR x HR x HR x HR
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + + +
12 7 13 8               m m mx HR x HR µ+ + +
 (9) 
 
The variables of the Z vector, described in more detail in the next section, are the 
network length of the system (Leng), the customer density (Dens), the proportion of raw water 
acquired from other utilities (Acq), the type of utility management (CM), a variable related to 
regulation (Reg) and a set of dummy variables related to the Portuguese hydrographical 
regions. m is the index which identifies each operator (municipality) and µ denotes the usual 
error term. 
The inclusion of water losses as an explanatory variable in the estimation of water 
utilities’ cost functions is very seldom found in the literature. The exceptions known are 
Garcia and Thomas (2001), Martins et al. (2006) and Martins (2007). According to these, 
water losses can be considered part of the overall inefficiency of the systems and an important 
concern for water utilities’ managers in terms of opportunity costs. From an efficient resource 
management point of view, water losses are undesirable but, when a final demand has to be 
satisfied and network leaks exist, utilities’ managers face a trade-off between repairing leaks 
and increasing water production. So we consider water losses as an output jointly “produced” 
with water delivered to customers. The presence of yL in our model reports if utilities find it 
profitable or not to have water losses in water production, and consequently whether they have 
incentives to repair network leaks, or, alternatively, if a regulatory policy is needed for water 
losses, to enforce more efficient water supply system. 
Marginal cost (MC) equations for each output can be easily obtained by differentiating 
equation (9) with respect to each output. Those marginal costs must represent nonnegative 
values throughout the relevant domain for equation (9) to be a proper cost function. 
As mentioned in Section 2, in order to calculate RAC it is necessary to aggregate the 
various outputs into a composite product. Then, considering the ratio (r) between yL and yS, we 
compute the following composite product: S sY y ry= + , with 11Sy Yr= +  and 1L
ry Y
r
= + . It 
is therefore possible to transform equation (9) into a single product cost function, as follows: 
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where 
1
l
k k
k
A a x z
=
= +∑ . 
From (10) we obtain the marginal and ray average cost for the composite product: 
( ) ( )2 2 21 2 1 2 1 221 1( , ) 1 (1 )MC Y r b rb c r c rc c Yr r= + + + ++ +  (11); 
( ) ( )2 2 21 2 1 2 1 221 1 1( , ) 1 2 (1 )ARAC Y r b rb c r c rc c YY r r= + + + + ++ +  (12) 
 
These measures are very helpful in the cost structure analysis, allowing the interpretation 
of economies of scale, the existence of a minimum efficient scale on the relevant range of 
production, and to evaluate the production mix in terms of industry efficiency. 
 
5. Data and estimation procedures 
Local communities in Portugal have been responsible for the provision of local water 
supply and sanitation services since the 1970s. Nowadays these services can be directly 
provided by municipalities (through municipal services), by municipalized services3 (hereafter 
designated as SMAS) or by firms. In this last case, there are both municipal public firms and 
also concessionaries, which can be private, public or public-private partnerships. 
The rule is one operator for each municipality. Therefore, the Portuguese water industry 
is considerably fragmented. Indeed, if we consider entities operating in both wholesale and 
retail water services then there are more than 280 water supply service providers for the 278 
municipalities in mainland Portugal. 
Economic regulation is restricted to concessions, and it is limited to a light form of 
benchmarking regulation, known as “sunshine regulation”. This means that the regulator only 
collects data from operators and discloses information about their relative performance in an 
annual report. IRAR’s power in the field of setting prices is limited to issuing non-binding 
opinions about pricing regimes, based on an allowed rate of return, and only when it comes to 
                                                 
3 These services are business units which, unlike municipal ones, have financial and management autonomy, 
although without a legal standard. 
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wholesale activity. Regarding retail concessions, the pricing system is one criterion for the 
selection of the bidders, so it is regulated by the concession contract. But where regulation of 
quality of water for human consumption is concerned, all water utilities face the same 
regulatory environment, regardless of the type of arrangement. 
Our dataset is composed of data relating to 2002 from INSAAR (National Survey on 
Water Supply and Wastewater Systems), made available by the Portuguese National Water 
Institute (INAG); from APDA (Portuguese Association of Water Suppliers); and from the 
Portuguese National Statistics Office (INE). It is a cross-section data base containing 
information from 265 utilities. 
The dependent variable, total cost (C), was computed as the sum of direct operation and 
management costs, financial costs (interest charges), raw water acquisition expenses (when 
applicable) and other general costs, such as assets depreciation (INSAAR, 2005). Thus, it is 
similar to what Rogers et al. (2002) have termed “water supply costs”4. In relation to this it is 
important to note that, as it is usual in the empirical literature, because we are using 
accounting data, we are not able to include some relevant cost components of the true 
economic cost, such as opportunity costs5 and environmental and economic externalities. 
Concerning the output variables, yL was directly available from INSAAR, while yS6 was 
computed as the sum of water delivered by public networks to agriculture, households, 
industry, commerce and services, to other water utilities and to other kinds of customers. 
In this analysis, two subsets of other variables (included in the Z vector) are considered. 
The first set includes the network length (Leng); the customer density (Dens); the proportion 
of raw water acquired from other utilities (Acq), which we calculated by dividing the amount 
of water acquired from other utilities by the computed value of total amount of water produced 
(from several sources); the type of utility management (CM), a dummy which is equal to 1 if 
                                                 
4 Stephenson (2003:209) gives an extensive list of factors affecting water supply costs. 
5 Green (2003:253) considers it more appropriate to use the expression “opportunity value” because it refers to 
the value of water in an alternative use. 
6 A correction was made to an exceptional case concerning Empresa Portuguesa de Águas Livres, SA (EPAL). 
EPAL is the unique case of a municipal system, providing retail water supply services to final customers in the 
city area of Lisbon, and simultaneously a multimunicipal system. In this last activity, EPAL acts as wholesale 
provider to other municipalities. The water delivered to other utilities represents a great part of total water 
produced compared with the residual role of this part of the business to the whole group of water utilities. Thus, 
the quantity of water delivered to other utilities by EPAL was ignored, along with the corresponding part in terms 
of costs.  
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the utility has a corporate management and 0 otherwise7 and a dummy variable related to 
regulation (Reg), equal to 1 if the utility faces an economic regulation environment and 0 
otherwise. 
The second subset corresponds to the group of dummy variables related to the eight8 
hydrographical regions (HR)9. With these variables, we intend to find out whether the water 
utilities cost structure varies systematically with the location in a specific HR, as long as there 
is different spatial availability and utilization of water resources. The series for each of these 
variables is computed admitting the value 1 if the utility belongs to one of the specific HR and 
0 otherwise. 
Empirical literature on the estimation of water industry cost functions reveals that the 
input prices most commonly used are capital, raw water, labour and energy input prices. 
Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, there are no available data for input prices faced by 
Portuguese water utilities10. 
Constrained by the availability of data, we considered capital a quasi-fixed input (in the 
sense that its modification in the short-run is either not feasible or extremely costly), letting its 
effect be captured by variables such as Leng and Dens. Dens was computed by dividing the 
number of customers of the water supply service (number of connections to the water network 
system) by the area of the municipality (in square kilometres) in order to obtain a measure of 
customer density. Similar significance is given to these variables by Garcia and Reynaud 
(2004) and Aubert and Reynaud (2005). 
Concerning raw water, its effect on total cost is captured by the Acq variable. Regarding 
labour and energy inputs, and due to the data constraints mentioned, we have assumed that 
                                                 
7 In order to compute CM we considered that municipalized water services, municipal water firms and 
concessionaries (public or private) have a corporate management style, and that municipalities (municipal 
services), have a non-corporate management style. 
8 HR1 – Minho and Lima; HR2 – Cávado, Ave and Leça; HR3 – Douro; HR4 – Vouga, Mondego, Lis and Ribeiras 
do Oeste; HR5 – Tejo; HR6 – Sado and Mira; HR7 – Guadiana; HR8 – Ribeiras do Algarve. 
9 A hydrographical region (HR) is defined in the Portuguese Water Law (Law no. 58/ 2008, which transposes the 
WFD for Portugal) as the “land area and sea consisting of one or more contiguous river basins and the associated 
underground and coastal water resources, being the main unit of management of the river basins”. 
10 Even when considering the data collected by INSAAR, the small number of operators which provide 
information concerning, for example, their labour costs or energy costs, do not provide data on the number of 
hours worked, nor on the amount of energy used. Thus, it was not possible to compute the respective input prices. 
This situation can be explained by the fact that of the overwhelming majority of operators do not implement 
appropriate cost accounting procedures. 
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utilities face similar inputs prices11. This assumption means that, as input prices cannot be 
explicitly incorporated, they are considered to be included in the fixed components and in the 
coefficients to be estimated, as unspecified functions of the vector W. 
Table 2 summarizes some descriptive statistics of the variables used. 
Table 2 – Sample descriptive statistics 
Series Obs Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
C 218 1,771,827.592 3,718,236.988 1,575 27,760,143.5 
yS 218 1.850 4.076 0.097 41.538 
yL 218 0.614 1.732 0.003 18.771 
Leng 218 251.140 384.619 0.06 3,957 
Dens 218 137.852 440.138 1.184 3,944.992 
Acq 218 0.274 0.379 0 1 
CM 218 0.252 0.435 0 1 
Reg 218 0.073 0.261 0 1 
HR1 218 0.055 0.229 0 1 
HR2 218 0.082 0.276 0 1 
HR3 218 0.261 0.440 0 1 
HR4 218 0.280 0.450 0 1 
HR5 218 0.289 0.454 0 1 
HR6 218 0.069 0.254 0 1 
HR7 218 0.096 0.296 0 1 
HR8 218 0.060 0.237 0 1 
 
 The variability of the data is quite high, as revealed, for example, by the amount of 
potable water delivered, ranging from 90,000 to 41,500,000 cubic meters. Indeed, because 
cross-section data is used, White’s variance-covariance matrix procedure for 
heteroscedasticity correction was applied in the econometric estimation. 
Provided that the model represented by equation (9) was not linear12, it was estimated 
using a nonlinear method: the maximum likelihood13, with the Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb, 
Shanno (BFGS)14 algorithm. 
 
                                                 
11 This assumption could not be very restrictive because Portugal is a small country and thus labour (particularly 
in municipalities and other public organisations) and energy prices are similar across its regions. 
12 Although the model represented by equation (9) in is not linear, with a redefinition of independent variables 
(previously modifying the series related to outputs, in order to obtain the squares and the products) it should be 
possible to use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method. However, this redefinition might not ensure 
(as confirmed by the attempts done) that the coefficients of y2S and y2L would be nonnegative and that the 
coefficient of yS.yL would be equal to the square root of the product of the coefficients of y2S and y2L. 
13 As explained by Greene (2003: 468-492) or by Johnston and DiNardo (2000: 164). 
14  Described in Estima (2004: 253 and after) and in Greene (2003: 170). 
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6. Empirical results 
The estimation results15 obtained for the quadratic cost function that was set out in 
equation (9), and applying the methodology described above, are reported in Table 316. 
Table 3 – Regression results 
Parameters Variable Coefficients t-statistic 
a Const. -635,332.6 * -2.284
b1 yS 444,401.6 ** 5.318
b2 yL 601,694.4 ** 3.547
c1 yS -0.000135  0.000
c2 yL -0.000245  0.000
x1 Leng 440.986  0.989
x2 Dens 1,144.94  1.298
x3 Acq 1,124,869.9 ** 5.456
x4 CM 937,294.1 ** 3.409
x5 Reg 388,279.44  0.762
x6 HR1 689,466.44 * 2.344
x7 HR2 -185,152.2  -0.869
x8 HR3 264,882  1.385
x9 HR4 496,864.17  1.601
x10 HR5 354,609.94  1.174
x11 HR6 21,939.948  0.120
x12 HR7 27,351.247  0.120
x13 HR8 601,018.31 ** 2.579
Observations   218
R2       0.89787
* Significant at 5% 
** Significant at 1% 
 
The model considered seems to fit the data well, as indicated by the adjusted R2 value of 
approximately 0.90. Even though the estimated regression constant, a, is negative, it is more 
relevant to analyse the value of the overall constant, which corresponds to the fixed costs. As 
suggested by Kwoka (2002), this overall constant can be obtained by adding to the regression 
constant the product of the mean value of the other variables (that have no interactions with 
the outputs) by their corresponding estimated coefficient. Indeed, a joint significance test for 
                                                 
15 Using WinRATS 6.02 software. 
16 The parameters were obtained through an iterative process, which converged after 490 iterations. 
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these variables confirms their statistical significance17 and the overall constant becomes 
positive. 
In relation to the output variables, the estimation results indicate that the coefficients for 
yS and yL have the expected positive signal and are both statistically significant. On the 
contrary and unfortunately, the estimated coefficients for the c1 and c2 parameters are not. 
Regarding the subset of variables included in the Z vector, apart from the HR ones, only 
the coefficients for the Acq and CM variables are significant at 1% level. The fact that the Acq 
variable is positively correlated with total costs may indicate that it is more expensive to buy 
wholesale water than to produce it. The CM variable is positively correlated with total costs, 
suggesting that when water is supplied by a corporate management entity, which corresponds 
to the biggest utilities in terms of volume of water delivered and population served, its total 
costs are higher than those faced by smaller utilities. 
Concerning the Leng and Dens variables, their coefficients are not statistically 
significant. However, the Leng coefficient exhibits the expected positive sign, suggesting that 
an increase in the size of the network increases total costs. 
The fact that the Reg variable does not reveal statistical significance is not surprising 
since economic regulation in the Portuguese water industry does not seem to be effective in 
relation to cost efficiency. 
With respect to the subset of HR variables, even though most of them are not 
individually statistically significant, a joint significance test18 for these variables confirms their 
importance to the model. Although the relevance of environmental and resource costs 
(remember the legal imposition of its recovery by water utilities pricing policies, mentioned 
earlier), these results are not entirely surprising since those cost elements were not taken into 
account when computing total costs. In fact, when composing the database it was observed 
that only two water utilities had provided19 information related to these types of costs for the 
year 2002. 
 Among the HR variables used, only HR8 is significant at 1% level. Its positive and 
significant influence on costs may come from its specificities. HR8 is the Algarve tourism 
                                                 
17 2χ (14) = 134.698809, significant at 1% level. 
18 2χ (8) = 24.178901, significant at 1% level. 
19 Which seems to derive from difficulties of measuring and accounting those costs and not that they do not exist. 
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region which has the highest water capitation index (INAG, 2007), due to the great percentage 
of usage of water for various purposes such as golf and other tourism activities, highly 
intensive in terms of water consumption.  
As mentioned in Sections 2 and 4, in order to calculate RAC it is necessary to 
aggregate the various outputs into a composite product (see equation 10). With the estimated 
coefficients obtained and considering the overall constant, the estimated cost function comes 
out as: 
( )
( )2 22
1580,135 444, 402 .61 601694 .37
1
1   0 .0000000091 0 .0000000301 0.0000000165
(1 )
C r Y
r
r r Y
r
∧ = + ++
+ + ++
 
Ceteris paribus, a lower water losses ratio r drives RAC and marginal cost downwards. 
For instance, considering the industry average in terms of the composite output, roughly 
speaking, the reduction of r to 10%20 would reduce the RAC by 3.5% and the marginal cost by 
5%.  
In order to analyse the behaviour of costs we simulated three levels of production: small, 
industry average and large scale, considering the proportion r = /L Sy y  fixed at the industry 
average level. The “small” scale corresponds to a production level of 0.5 million m3 of the 
composite output and the “large”21 scale of 20 million m3. Then, we computed both marginal 
and ray average costs, and the degree of economies of scope and of scale for the composite 
product, as defined in Sections 2 and 4, for the production scales specified above. These 
results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Costs and economies of scale and scope  
Output (106 m3) Marginal Cost (EUR/m3) Scale of 
production yS yL Y yS yL Y 
RAC 
(EUR/m3) SP SL 
Small 0,375416 0,124584 0,500000 0,44 0,60 0,48 1,64 0,706 3,399 
Industry average 1,850229 0,614012 2,464241 0,44 0,60 0,48 0,72 0,327 1,487 
Large 15,016624 4,983376 20,000000 0,44 0,60 0,48 0,51 0,057 1,060 
 
                                                 
20 The economically optimum level of water losses, reported by OECD (2006:23), is, on average, between 10 and 
20% depending on the nature of individual systems. 
21 This scale falls into the group of the biggest water utilities, according to the criteria of APDA (2006), which 
covers utilities with more than 100,000 customers. 
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Table 4 reveals that the marginal costs for each of the two specific outputs are almost22 
constant for the three production scales considered. The marginal cost for yL is greater than the 
marginal cost of yS. Therefore, it seems that it is cheaper to produce one additional m3 of yS 
than of yL, which may be an incentive for reducing water losses. 
However, as revealed by the values for the degree of economies of scope (greater than 
0), it appears that the joint production of water delivered to final users and water losses is 
advantageous (in terms of costs), especially for small producers. Thus, it may be a counter-
argument to cutting water losses. For the smallest utilities (and even for medium ones, 
although less evident), water losses can be viewed as a way to compensate the small scale of 
production. For these operators, it can be inferred from the level of economies of scale that it 
may preferable to invest in expanding production and storage capacity (even if it implies a 
greater level of water losses), than in the prevention, detection and repairing of leaks in the 
system networks, especially if the first option is publicly subsidized. 
Regarding the composite output, for the relevant output range, the RAC and economies 
of scale decrease as more Y is produced. The smaller utilities seem to benefit from strong 
economies of scale, while for the largest production scale suggested economies of scale are 
almost extinguished. 
In terms of subadditivity, it seems possible to confirm that there is ray subadditivity 
because RAC is decreasing with the composite output, for the ratio r, computed according to 
the industry average. Therefore, the industry is a natural monopoly for that mix of production. 
The industry average production scale does not exhaust the returns to scale allowed. 
Therefore, more concentration in the water industry should be advantageous in terms of 
economic efficiency, since it would enable advantage to be taken from economies of scale. 
This agglomeration benefit is particularly clear for small and medium sized water utilities. 
Obviously, this efficiency advantage only seems feasible for contiguous operators. Besides, 
due to the WFD’s imposition of complete recovery of total costs through pricing policies, such 
a strategy would also benefit consumers of water services by the decrease in prices it would 
permit. 
 
                                                 
22 In Table 5 only two decimal places were considered when reporting marginal costs. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
The current study of the cost structure of Portugal’s water utilities is original in using the 
broad (and first) database collected on water supply. Moreover, it is innovative in terms of the 
inclusion of variables related to the hydrographical regions to which water utilities belong. 
The results of this study generally agree with the empirical literature and allow us to 
highlight some general conclusions. Our findings suggest that there are economies of scope 
from the production of water supply and water losses taken together, meaning that it could be 
advantageous in terms of technical efficiency for those utilities to maintain some level of 
water losses than to repair the leaks. 
Another major conclusion of this study is that the industry seems to exhibit economies of 
scale. Therefore, there are pro-aggregation arguments, especially for small and medium sized 
local water supply systems. Considering the recovery of costs principle, imposed by the WFD, 
the advantages of such agglomeration would be transferred to users through the likely 
reduction in the tariff levels. 
Even though, in general, the variables related to the hydrographical variables used did 
not present significant effects on water costs, this does not mean that they are not important to 
the industry costs. In fact, the resource costs are expected to be directly related to water 
scarcity, which varies among river basins and hydrographical regions. In our view, the point is 
that the water operators are not yet appropriately accounting those costs. 
Some important policy implications can be derived from the study. One of them is the 
exhibition of economies of scope between water supply and water losses, which confirms the 
relevance of an intervention by the regulatory authority on this subject. A key policy 
recommendation is therefore that the suggestion or definition of an adequate smaller level of 
water losses by the regulatory authorities may take into account differences among utilities. 
Although these economies of scope are moderate, their relevance stems from the fact that they 
could be viewed as way to compensate for the small scale of some municipal utilities, since 
the water industry seems to have high economies of scale for the smaller scales of production 
considered. 
However, it should be noted that IRAR’s limited power to impose or to eliminate 
barriers to entry into the water industry restricts its role in the promotion of an appropriate 
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market structure. This means that the regulatory authority should be given more effective 
powers in the Portuguese water industry, especially by extending regulatory control to all the 
operators. 
Another policy implication of the study is that there is a trade-off between the economic 
and environmental consequences of water losses, which should be appropriately managed by 
decision makers. This seems to be of particular relevance in the context of scarce water 
resources. Despite the European and national legal impositions of the complete recovery of 
water costs, including environmental and resource costs, Portuguese water utilities do not 
properly account these categories of costs. In our opinion, this situation should be changed, 
given that it occurs not because these costs do not exist at all, but because few utilities apply 
proper cost accounting methods. As long as environmental and resource costs are not 
incorporated, they are not recovered by prices either. 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that the most accessible and best quality sources 
of water are the first ones to be used. As long as it is necessary to use other sources, less 
accessible and of worse quality, the environment and scarcity costs tend to increase. 
Therefore, it means that if all those components of costs could have been included in the 
analysis the results of the study could be modified. Hence, regulatory authorities and other 
policy makers need to be aware that when the operators are, in fact, compelled to recover 
those costs, consumers will suffer the consequences in higher water tariffs. Thus, it is crucial 
to counter-balance this direct influence on tariffs with a higher level of technical efficiency in 
water supply systems. 
The results obtained have to be interpreted with caution, due to the context and 
limitations of the study. Although we have used the most recently collected data for the 
Portuguese water sector, no data are available for some relevant variables, such as the input 
prices and the opportunity, resource and environmental costs, and there is a lack of more 
detailed information related to availability versus utilization of water resources at integrated 
river basin level. Further research is also needed on testing for some cost functions properties, 
and this is only possible if the types of variables mentioned above are included in the 
estimation process. The limitations are nonetheless simultaneously pointers for further 
research. 
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